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INTRODUCTION 
Animals’ long-standing status as property serves to 
hinder many attempts to secure rights and protections for 
animals in the legal arena.  Even within the realm of 
property law, states vary on how animals are viewed and 
protected.1  Because of these long-held views and 
inconsistencies, the rights of animals are not taken as 
seriously as is warranted.  Moreover, a person’s interest in 
animals has been trivialized, especially regarding the ability 
to obtain standing in a legal proceeding.2
This Comment will explore the different ways animals 
are viewed and treated in the legal world.  It will focus on 
how these views affect the concept of people having a valid 
legal interest in animals and their rights, and whether or not 
that interest should create standing in courts.  Part I of this 
Comment will lay a foundation describing how animals are 
viewed throughout the states as property and the different 
rights afforded to them.
  The interests of 
animals and their rights would be furthered if a greater 
significance were placed on people’s interests in them. 
3  It will explain legislation and cases 
that show the inconsistencies of the states and the courts.  
Part II will identify the legal problem that this uncertain and 
old-fashioned view has created in the current legal 
atmosphere.4  Part III will analyze how the status of animals 
as property has affected the significance of a person’s interest 
in animals and how that interest is treated in determining 
standing.5  And Part IV will offer a proposal to help solve the 
problem and clarify inconsistencies.6
 
 1. See generally ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ANIMAL PROTECTION 
LAWS OF THE USA & CANADA (7th ed. 2012), available at 
http://aldf.org/article.php?id=259 (providing a list of animal protection laws for 
each state and Canada) (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
  This includes viewing 
 2. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding 
that the plaintiffs, who had an interest in seeing endangered species in a 
particular area in the future, lacked standing to sue because they did not show 
the required injury). 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
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animals as something greater than property, with their own 
protected rights, and allowing animals and the people who 
have an interest in them to have standing to sue in court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Currently, animals are legally regarded as property.7  
However, to many people, they are regarded as something 
more than a possession, even rising to the level of a family 
member.8  This legal status has caused controversy in cases 
dealing with injuries or death of a family pet.9  It has also 
brought into question what precisely constitutes legal 
standing in cases.10  An animal’s property status under the 
law affects the way people and the law treat them, and 
ultimately hinders the advancement of their rights as non-
human animals.11
A. Animals Regarded as Property 
 
Although the history of considering animals to be 
property is deeply rooted in the United States,12 people’s 
views of animals and their rights have changed over the 
years.13
 
 7. See generally Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the 
Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314 (2007) 
(discussing changes in the way people value their companion animals and 
advocating a change in the legal status of animals as property). 
  The value of a pet has become more culturally 
 8. In Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275 
(Cal. 1994), the court ruled that a pet restriction at a condominium could be 
enforced against a condominium owner.  Justice Arabian’s dissent states that 
the pet restriction is unreasonable in light of the “cherished association with . . . 
household animals,” and the “substantial benefits derived from pet ownership.”  
Id. at 1292 (Arabian, J., dissenting).  Justice Arabian discusses the “substantial 
pleasures of pet ownership,” and how “[e]motionally, [pets] allow a connection 
full of sensation and delicacy of feeling,” pointing to both the “well-established 
and long-standing historical and cultural relationship between human beings 
and their pets and the value they impart,” and the “well-established place pets 
have found in our hearts and homes.”  Id. at 1293–95. 
 9. Hankin, supra note 7, at 321–40 (discussing how to value the damages 
an owner suffers as a result of an injury or death of a pet). 
 10. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 11. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Standing For Animals (With Notes on 
Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333 (2000). 
 12. See Hankin, supra note 7, at 321–40. 
 13. See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 215–19 (updated ed. 2009).  A 
distinction between a direct duty and an indirect duty to animals can be made.  
Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of 
Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 177 (2001).  A direct duty is one 
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relevant.  Many people with pets spend great amounts of 
time, energy, and money on their animal family members, 
and would be outraged to find out that in some states their 
pet’s value, if injured or killed, would remain merely at its 
market value.14  Depending on the breed, age, and if the pet 
was adopted from a shelter, the value of a beloved family pet 
could be nominal.15
The injury or death of a companion animal is treated 
differently across the states.
 
16  Some states only allow 
damages up to the market value of the pet,17 while others 
allow recovery for veterinary expenses, emotional distress, 
and the intrinsic value of the pet.18  For example, in a case 
where a pet dog died from heat stroke while being stored in 
an airplane’s baggage compartment,19 the court found that 
the owner was not entitled to recover damages from 
emotional distress based merely on the loss of property in the 
form of his dog.20
 
we, as people, have to animals because the animals have their own interests—
interests which animal protection laws are enacted to protect.  See id.  An 
indirect duty is “one we have by virtue of our relationship to other humans.”  Id.  
Such indirect duties aim to stop “perverse human sentiments” that “increase[] 
human suffering.”  Id. 
  The law did not allow damages for the loss 
 14. Hankin, supra note 7, at 323 (referencing one Alaska Supreme Court 
case). 
 15. See id. at 321–32 (discussing how different states have measured 
damages for the injury or death of a pet). 
 16. Id. at 322–41. 
 17. Id. at 322–23. 
 18. Id. at 325–41.  Different courts have treated this valuation differently, 
with some allowing for emotional distress to the family, some allowing those 
damages only for dogs and cats, and some allowing damages for only intentional 
conduct.  Id.  A California case, Martinez v. Robledo, 210 Cal. App. 4th 384 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012), held that pet owners of an injured pet may recover damages of 
reasonable costs of treatment, and are thus not limited to the market value of 
the pet.  Id.  The court noted that the law “already treats animals differently 
from other forms of personal property,” as the law “generally does not treat the 
abuse . . . of one’s own property as a crime,” but does so for the abuse of animals.  
Id. at 391.   
Given the Legislature’s historical solicitude for the proper care and 
treatment of animals, and the array of criminal penalties for the 
mistreatment of animals, as well as the reality that animals are living 
creatures, the usual standard of recovery for damaged personal 
property—market value—is inadequate when applied to injured pets. 
Id. at 392.  This case demonstrates the shift in view allowing more rights and 
value for animals as pets, based on the special place they have grown to take in 
our home and society. 
 19. Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 20. Id. at 157. 
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of companionship of an animal.21  There was also no cause of 
action in that state for the pain and suffering of an animal.22
In other circumstances, however, courts have awarded 
non-economic damages, such as emotional distress, to the 
family of an injured or killed pet.
 
23  In one case, a plaintiff’s 
dog was put to sleep at the veterinary office, and the plaintiff 
arranged an elaborate funeral for the dog, with the veterinary 
office to deliver the body in a casket.24  The office wrongfully 
disposed of the body, and instead sent the body of a cat inside 
the casket.25  This caused great mental distress to the 
plaintiff and deprived her of the right to have a proper 
funeral to bury her pet.26  The court, in overruling prior 
precedent that an animal is merely personal property,27 held 
that the plaintiff could recover damages for emotional 
distress because a “pet is not just a thing but occupies a 
special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of 
personal property.”28  These different views and court rulings 
establish little in the way of certainty about the value and 
status of an animal in any given jurisdiction.  Although 
commentators have suggested that the status of animals 
should be something more than property,29
 
 21. Id. at 158. 
 no significant 
 22. Id. at 159. 
 23. Hankin, supra note 7, at 332 (noting that such an award almost always 
involves intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 24. Corso v. Dog & Cat Hosp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 182–83 (City Civ. Ct. 
1979). 
 25. Id. at 183. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  However, other courts within the state have not accepted this 
ruling.  See Gluckman, 844 F. Supp. 151 (1994).  “In viewing a pet as more than 
property, however, the Corso opinion, and the few cases that follow it, are 
aberrations flying in the face of overwhelming authority to the contrary.”  Id. at 
158. 
 28. Corso, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183. 
 29. Hankin, supra note 7, at 341, 376–88, 410; see Thomas G. Kelch, 
Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531 (1998) 
(arguing for a move away from the traditional view of animals as property and 
towards a new status as non-property).  Although animals have, at one point in 
history, been put on trial and held responsible for crimes, the shift has been 
made away from this idea.  See Kolber, supra note 13, at 179.  This history of 
animal trials demonstrates that the concept of having animals in court and 
having their interests represented in one aspect in the legal system is not that 
far-fetched of an idea.  Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the 
Medieval Animal Trials Can Teach Us About Justice for Animals, 17 ANIMAL L. 
273, 273 (2011); see also Kolber, supra note 13, at 180.  Animals being tried in 
their own cases “open[ed] up the possibility of thinking of animals as having a 
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action has been taken to change their property status. 
B. Legal Advancements of Animal Protections 
The advancements of animals’ legal rights have become 
more prevalent in both state and federal law.30  Every state 
now has laws against cruelty to animals.31  Federal statutes 
have been created to protect animals, endangered species, 
and the welfare of animals.32  Even with these statutes, 
however, issues remain regarding who has standing to sue on 
behalf of an animal and how the laws are enforced.33
1. State Anti-Cruelty Laws 
 
Each state has enacted its own animal protection laws to 
prevent and punish cruelty to animals.34  The inconsistencies 
across the states, however, show a varying degree of animal 
protection, with some states having more comprehensive laws 
and harsher punishments than others.35  While states are 
beginning to increase and expand their anti-cruelty laws and 
penalties, there are still obstacles regarding enforcement and 
coverage.36
States have broadened their animal protection laws by 
expanding the types of offenses and increasing penalties.
 
37  
States have also imposed duties on people who own animals.38
 
form of partial legal personhood.”  Sykes, supra, at 295.  In the historic trials, 
“ ‘ animals were imbued with sufficient legal personhood to permit the law to act 
upon them as it would upon similarly-situated humans.’ ”  Id. at 296 (quoting 
Anila Srivastava, “Mean, Dangerous, and Uncontrollable Beasts”: Mediaeval 
Animal Trials, 40 MOSAIC 127, 128 (2007)). 
  
Some laws mandate that animal owners provide proper food, 
 30. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1333, 1337. 
 31. Id. at 1337. 
 32. Id. at 1339. 
 33. Id. at 1335. 
 34. See generally ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 2011 U.S. ANIMAL 
PROTECTION LAWS RANKINGS (2011), available at http://aldf.org/downloads/ 
ALDF2011USRankingsReport.pdf (providing a comparative analysis of the 
comprehensiveness and strength of each state’s animal protection laws).  For an 
example of a determination of what is a pet, see People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 
66 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that pet goldfish are companion animals within the 
meaning of an anti-cruelty statute). 
 35. See ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 34. 
 36. Hankin, supra note 7, at 365–70. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 368.  See generally ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 34 
(comparing animal protection laws of the states, including laws regulating 
cruelty, neglect, and basic standards of care). 
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water, and shelter, as well as veterinary care.39  However, 
these laws vary greatly in their coverage and penalties across 
the states,40 creating inconsistencies and possible confusion 
about the importance of these animal protection laws.  
Although these laws and protections vary by jurisdiction, 
there has been a general movement among the states towards 
offering greater protection for animals and greater penalties 
when animals are subject to cruelty or neglect.41
There are two major complications with state anti-cruelty 
laws regarding their enforcement.  First, the laws are often 
not adequately enforced in practice.
 
42  Enforcement is 
unreliable and greatly depends on the willingness of the 
prosecution to try the case.43  Animal cruelty and neglect 
cases are a low priority for over-worked prosecutors.44  
Prosecutions are generally only seen in the most 
reprehensible cases,45 while other violations go unprosecuted 
and unpunished.46
Secondly, state anti-cruelty laws do not generally apply 
when the animal is used on a farm, in a factory for the 
production of food, or in a laboratory for medical or scientific 
purposes.
 
47  Animal exploitation in these areas often goes 
unregulated,48 and cruelty against the animals there is 
common practice.49
 
 39. Hankin, supra note 7, at 368. 
  This distinction between animals kept as 
companions and those used for consumer goods clouds the 
overall concept of what animal protection and animal rights 
mean to people and the legislature. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 365–68. 
 42. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1337–40. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 1339. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1339, 1363; see Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 444 (Md. 1983) 
(holding that because “there are certain normal human activities to which the 
infliction of pain to an animal is purely incidental and unavoidable,” the anti-
cruelty law did not apply to researchers conducting medical and scientific 
research). 
 48. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339. 
 49. See Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law, and Advocacy for Animals, 1 J. 
ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63, 72 (2006) (discussing the problems animal advocates 
face against the exploitation of animals at institutions using them for consumer 
goods). 
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2. Federal Legislative Action 
Progress has also been made in protecting animal welfare 
on the federal level.50  A number of federal statutes have been 
passed to protect animals, endangered species, and to control 
other areas affecting animals, such as humane slaughter and 
conservation efforts.51  Although the enactment of such 
statutes puts animal protection laws on the map, there are 
still obstacles in the enforcement of the laws.52  These hurdles 
include the lack of resources to enforce the laws and the 
limited ability to procure standing before courts.53
i. The Animal Welfare Act 
 
One of the most important of the federal animal law 
statutes is the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, which was 
amended in 1976.54  The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) aims to 
ensure humane handling and treatment of animals, with 
minimum requirements of care regarding food, water, 
housing, transportation, shelter, sanitation, and animal well-
being.55  The United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) is designated to enforce the statute, which has been 
criticized as being ineffective and underenforced.56
One limitation to the enforcement of the AWA is the 
USDA’s lack of resources.
 
57  Because the AWA is only subject 
to public enforcement, private actors must rely on the USDA 
to use its limited budget to bring an action.58  This has proved 
to be unreliable.59  Private citizens and the affected animals 
do not have the ability to sue for wrongdoings.60
 
 50. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339. 
  Courts have 
held that the AWA “does not create a private cause of action 
and that Congress intended that only the Secretary of 
 51. Kelch, supra note 29, at 542–44. 
 52. Id. at 532, 543. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2156 (2006).  See generally Michael Hill, The Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act: The Need for a Whistleblower Exception, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 651, 658–61 (2010). 
 55. Hill, supra note 54, at 660; Kelch, supra note 29, at 542; Sunstein, supra 
note 11, at 1341. 
 56. Hill, supra note 54, at 661; Kelch, supra note 29, at 543; Sunstein, supra 
note 11, at 1363–64, 1366. 
 57. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1364, 1366. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1342. 
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Agriculture be able to enforce the law.”61  The claims of 
private citizen alleging violations of the AWA often go 
unanswered.62
Another restriction of the AWA is the narrow scope of its 
application.  The sections governing animal research only 
apply to a select number of warm-blooded animals, excluding 
many others.
 
63  Animals used for food and clothing production 
on farms are left unprotected under the AWA, as well as in 
many states where they are not subject to state anti-cruelty 
laws.64
ii. The Endangered Species Act 
  Though important, the AWA by no means offers fail 
proof protection for America’s animals. 
Another federal statute aimed at protecting the rights of 
animals is the Endangered Species Act of 1973.65  The statute 
was created to offer protection against extinction to 
endangered or threatened species.66  The Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) differs from the AWA in enforcement because it 
allows for a citizen-suit—in other words, it authorizes an 
individual person to sue for a violation of the Act.67  This 
gives people more power to ensure the enforcement of an 
animal protection law, but it comes with its own obstacles.  
Even though a citizen may bring suit, acquiring standing 
before a court still remains a challenge.68
C. What Constitutes Standing 
 
A major controversy in enforcement of animal protection 
laws is that it is often difficult to obtain standing in courts 
under the federal statutes.69
 
 61. Zimmerman v. Wolff, 622 F. Supp. 2d 240, 243–44 (E.D. Pa. 2008) 
(holding that the AWA does not provide a private cause of action). 
  There is confusion as to when 
 62. See id. 
 63. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2006); Hankin, supra note 7, at 366; Sunstein, supra 
note 11, at 1342.  The AWA only applies to certain animals, and excludes birds, 
rats and mice, horses not for research, and farm animals.  See 7 U.S.C. § 
2132(g). 
 64. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1342. 
 65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (2006). 
 66. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339. 
 67. Hill, supra note 54, at 665. 
 68. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they did not show a sufficiently 
imminent injury). 
 69. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1334. 
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standing is available and when it is lacking.70  A person suing 
under a federal statute must sufficiently meet each standing 
requirement, and if one is missing, that person may not bring 
the suit.71  Animals on the other hand, have generally not 
been able to acquire standing in their own right.72  These 
restrictions place a burden on the enforcement of the statutes, 
and ultimately, on the rights of animals.73
1. Constitutional Requirements of Standing 
 
For a person to have standing to bring suit in a federal 
jurisdiction, they must sufficiently satisfy three 
requirements74: (1) the complaining party must have an 
injury in fact, (2) there must be a causal connection between 
the conduct and the claimed injury, and (3) the injury must 
be redressable by the courts.75  The first requirement is that 
the party suing must have an injury in fact, necessitating a 
“concrete and particularized” harm to that individual, and an 
“actual or imminent” violation of a legally protected 
interest.76  The alleged injury may not be “conjectural” or 
“hypothetical.”77  The second causal connection requirement 
means that the injury must be traceable to the alleged 
misconduct.78  The third requirement dictates that it must be 
“likely” that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
outcome by the courts.79
 
 70. Id. 
  These requirements, however, have 
presented difficulties when trying to assert standing based on 
 71. See Kelch, supra note 29, at 535; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727 (1972).  Justice Douglas’ dissent in Sierra Club stated that inanimate 
objects are sometimes parties to litigation, that “[t]he voice of the inanimate 
object . . . should not be stilled,” that people should be able to speak on their 
behalf, and that “all of the forms of life . . . [should be able to] stand before the 
court—the pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings as 
well as the trout in the streams.”  Id. at 742, 749, 752 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 72. Hill, supra note 54, at 664; see Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 
1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that the named orca whales in the suit lacked 
standing to sue because they did not have a legally protected right based on 
statutory interpretation). 
 73. See Hill, supra note 54, at 665. 
 74. Kelch, supra note 29, at 535. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 561. 
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an interest in animals.80
2. Standing for Persons Suing Under Federal Statutes 
 
When suing under a federal statute, the complaining 
party must assert an injury to a legally protected interest in 
order to bring the suit in court.81  This interest may be 
aesthetic, recreational, or ecological.82  Some statutes, like the 
ESA, give private citizens a right to sue through a citizen-suit 
provision.83  Others, like the AWA, do not have such an 
avenue for private enforcement and it is up to the government 
to protect the interest outlined in the statute.84
In animal protection suits, courts differ in allowing 
standing based on the circumstances surrounding the 
plaintiffs’ stated interests in the animals.
 
85  In one case, a 
plaintiff had standing under the AWA because he sufficiently 
fulfilled the three standing requirements.86  His alleged 
injury was to his aesthetic interest in observing animals in 
humane conditions at a zoo he frequented.87  He was also 
involved in several animal organizations.88  The court held 
that the plaintiff had standing, as “people have a cognizable 
interest” in viewing animals being humanely treated.89
In another case, however, an organization lacked 
standing for failing to allege the required injury.
 
90  The 
organization claimed that the Navy’s shooting of goats on 
their own land negatively affected the organization’s cause.91
 
 80. Id. at 562–64. 
  
The court held that the organization did not have standing 
 81. Id. at 560. 
 82. Kelch, supra note 29, at 535; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1348. 
 83. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2006). 
 84. 7 U.S.C. § 2146 (2006). 
 85. Compare Animal Prot. Inst. of Am. v. Hodel, 860 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that an association did have standing because they had a special 
interest in the animals that are protected by the statute), with Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because 
they did not sufficiently allege that their corporation or its members would be 
injured by the alleged misconduct). 
 86. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc., v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
 87. Id. at 429. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 433. 
 90. Animal Lover’s Volunteer Ass’n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
 91. Id. at 938. 
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because it did not show that its members would suffer 
injury.92  The court stated that “[a] mere association of 
organizational interest in a problem” was not enough to allege 
the required injury for standing.93  “A general contention that 
because of their dedication to preventing inhumane treatment 
of animals, . . . members will suffer distress if the goats are 
shot d[id] not constitute an allegation of individual injury.”94  
Thus, the court did not find that the harm caused by shooting 
the goats created the injury needed, even though the 
members had a special interest in the humane treatment of 
the goats.95
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
 
96 the United States 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing 
to sue because they did not show a sufficiently imminent 
injury and did not claim that the injury would be redressable 
by the Court’s decision.97  The plaintiffs sued under the ESA, 
alleging that they would one day want to travel to see the 
endangered species in the wild, and the federally funded 
activities in foreign countries would likely increase the 
animals’ rate of extinction.98  The Court was not swayed.99  
The injury was not sufficiently applicable to the plaintiffs 
directly.100  The Court held that the injury to the plaintiffs 
was not imminent.101  The “some day” intentions to travel 
were inadequate for standing purposes.102  The Court needed 
a more specific and concrete plan from the plaintiffs to show 
the imminence and actual injury required for standing.103
The Court also held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
due to their failure to show redressability.
 
104
 
 92. Id. 
  The injury 
would not be remedied by the Court’s decision because the 
agencies funding the alleged misconduct were not parties to 
the action, therefore, the Court’s ruling would not affect their 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 562. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 564. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 568. 
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actions.105
Additionally, the Court discredited the plaintiffs’ “animal 
nexus” theory, by which “anyone who has an interest in 
studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the 
globe has standing.”
 
106  The Court stated that it was 
unacceptable that anyone who observes an endangered 
species anywhere in the world “is appreciably harmed by a 
single project affecting some portion of that species with 
which he has no more specific connection.”107  The Court 
rejected the notion that a “person with an interest in an 
animal automatically has standing to enjoin federal threats to 
that species of animal, anywhere in the world.”108  Further, 
the Court did not see why “such an interest in animals should 
be different from such an interest in anything else that is the 
subject of a lawsuit.”109  Thus, the plaintiffs’ interest in the 
animals and their general intention of seeing them in the 
future was not enough for the Court to confer standing in that 
case.110
However, in another case under the ESA, a plaintiff 
obtained standing because he demonstrated that the alleged 
injury was imminent and established redressability.
 
111  The 
plaintiff previously worked with the elephants of the Ringling 
Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus, where he developed 
a “strong, personal attachment to the animals.”112  His alleged 
injury was that he was prevented from visiting the elephants, 
now showing signs of mistreatment, because he would suffer 
“aesthetic and emotional injury” from seeing the elephants in 
that condition.113  Because of the plaintiff’s personal 
attachment to the elephants and his desire to visit them, the 
court held that his aesthetic injury was therefore sufficiently 
imminent.114
 
 105. Id. 
  Thus, in that case, the plaintiff acquired 
standing because of his close connection to the animals and 
 106. Id. at 566. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 567. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 564. 
 111. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & 
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 112. Id. at 335. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 338. 
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his imminent intent to visit them.115
3. Standing for Animals to Sue in Their Own Name 
 
Animals themselves generally do not have standing to 
sue in their own right.116  Legally considered to be property, 
animals do not have a legally protected interest under which 
to sue.117  States may vary on the issue of animal owners’ 
rights and bystanders’ rights, but this Comment focuses on 
federal animal protection rights.  Because Congress confers 
standing upon persons, animals lack standing to sue because 
they are not considered persons under the law (unlike minors 
or corporations).118  No statute currently confers standing 
upon animals on their own behalf.119  Although some courts 
have held that animals cannot bring suits as named 
plaintiffs, in an increasing number of cases, animals are 
doing just that.120
In one such case under the ESA, Palila v. Hawaii 
Department of Land and Natural Resources,
 
121 an endangered 
species of bird was a named plaintiff.122  The court stated that 
the Palila, “a party to this proceeding” who was represented 
by attorneys, “has a legal status and wings its way into 
federal court as a plaintiff in its own right.”123
Courts’ contrasting views regarding precisely what 
circumstances afford standing and who can invoke it leave 
the enforcement of animal protection laws unclear.
 
124
 
 115. Id. 
  The 
 116. Hill, supra note 54, at 664. 
 117. Id. at 665. 
 118. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1335, 1359.  Inanimate objects being right-
holders is seen in current law, and it may not be that far off of an idea for 
animals to have certain rights—although at first glance the idea of giving 
animals rights like corporations may seem scary or dangerous.  See Christopher 
D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 452–53, 455, 464 (1972).  Rights for animals do 
not need to encompass every right, or even the same rights as humans, because 
they are different; but they can share some degree of protection and rights.  See 
id. at 457.  Human animals should work together with non-human animals, 
compromising for the betterment of both.  See id. at 481.  This would be a step 
in the right direction in light of the value animals have in our society and in our 
homes. 
 119. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1359. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1107. 
 124. For an example where standing for an animal was denied, see Citizens 
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inconsistency and obscurity of the standing issue only make 
the enforcement and seriousness of animal laws more 
puzzling. 
II. LEGAL ISSUES CREATED 
The status of animals as property affects how they are 
treated under the law,125 and how their value and rights are 
perceived, by limiting their ability to have the protections 
that are created for them enforced and to have their interests 
be taken seriously.  Designated as property, animals have no 
legally cognizable right, and thus cannot have standing to sue 
to enforce the laws designed to protect them.126
Individuals also face obstacles when attempting to sue on 
behalf of animals and their own interests in animals.
  This, in 
effect, minimizes the ability for enforcement of animal 
protection laws, leaving more animals unprotected. 
127  
Often, they cannot sufficiently prove standing under the 
statute, and the statute goes unenforced, or enforced with 
severe inconsistencies and unreliability across courts.128
Animal protections are not taken seriously because 
animals are viewed as property, and as such, their rights will 
always fall behind human interests.
 
129  “Thus the game is 
rigged to render a result unfavorable to animals.”130
 
  Even a 
changing view in the value and interests in companion 
animals is not enough, without further legislative action and 
changes to current laws, to give animals the status and 
protections that they, and the people with an interest in 
them, deserve. 
 
to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. 
Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that dolphins lacked standing to sue). 
 125. Kelch, supra note 29, at 535. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.; see, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding 
that mere interest in an animal is not enough to satisfy the standing 
requirement); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they did not sufficiently allege injury). 
 128. Kelch, supra note 29, at 535. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 537.  The rights of animals should be expanded legally, but also 
must be put “to work with empathy, in a way that strives (despite the inevitable 
limitations of a human justice system in this respect) to incorporate the 
animals’ own interests and own point of view.”  Sykes, supra note 29, at 273. 
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III. EFFECTS OF ANIMALS’ PROPERTY STATUS ON STANDING 
REQUIREMENTS 
The current state of animal law is riddled with 
inconsistencies, ineffectiveness, and confusion.  The status of 
animals as property leads to many problems concerning the 
seriousness and understanding of their interests, enforcement 
of protection laws, and standing in court.  These dilemmas 
leave animals at a disadvantage.  The current laws regarding 
the status of animals and their protection are insufficient due 
to the inconsistencies caused by a lack of understanding of 
where animal law stands. 
A. Problems Resulting from Keeping Animals’ Status as 
Property 
The status of animals as property is based on long-held 
tradition.  The recent conflict and shift in the laws and 
perceptions of animals is derived from the increased 
awareness of animals’ rights and people’s changing view of 
animals by placing greater value on their companion 
animals.131  Animals have grown in significance in the daily 
lives of people who have them as pets.132  This changes the 
views and conceptions of animals.  Because pet owners place 
more value on their companion animals, they view animals as 
deserving of more value, and ultimately more rights and 
protections.133
Inanimate property and animals vary in significant ways.  
However, they are labeled the same under the law.  This 
creates problems when trying to apply a law to animals that 
is intended for inanimate property.  Animals are different 
than other property—they have the capacity to suffer
 
134
The conflict arises when we are told that under the law, 
animals and other inanimate property should be treated the 
same.  An animal’s capacity to suffer distinguishes it from 
other property, which justifies giving animals protections and 
 and 
to give love.  People form attachments with animals that they 
cannot have with other inanimate property.  This 
automatically sets them apart. 
 
 131. Hankin, supra note 7, at 316. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. at 316–19. 
 134. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1335, 1363–66. 
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other rights not afforded to property.135
The protections that would actually be afforded to 
animals through properly enforced laws are insufficient and 
not taken seriously in practice.  This is because the property 
status of animals does not accurately reflect how many people 
feel about animals.
  These difficult 
concepts within animal law cause doubt and inactivity, not 
only for citizens attempting to sue on behalf of animals, but 
also for the courts. 
136
One reason for the lack of seriousness is the failure to 
have a cohesive method throughout the states of applying 
value to injured or killed pets and of the coverage of anti-
cruelty laws, which in effect prohibits the legal world from 
seeing the laws and animals’ rights as important.
  Laws with valid intentions go 
unenforced, thus creating unsettled confusion and inhibiting 
clarity in animal law. 
137
At the federal level, confusion arises because the status 
of property is applied differently to different animals.
  Because 
there is no connection between the states, the ability to have 
a comprehensive application of equal and consistent law is 
shattered. 
138  For 
companion animals, laws vary on what damages are 
recoverable for their injury or death,139 however, further 
conflict surfaces when comparing them to farm or experiment 
animals.140  The same laws do not apply to animals used for 
food, consumer production, or experiments.141
It is difficult to justify and comprehend that while some 
animals are protected from cruelty and afforded certain 
rights, other animals, because of their use, generally have no 
protection against abuse and death.
  This 
categorizes animals differently without an acceptable reason 
and widens the gap in understanding how animals should be 
treated under the law. 
142
 
 135. Id. at 1363–65. 
  These animals, used 
on farms or for experiments, are simply a means to an end for 
a human interest, which outweighs any other interest 
 136. Hankin, supra note 7, at 319. 
 137. See id. at 368–70. 
 138. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339–42. 
 139. Kelch, supra note 29, at 537–39. 
 140. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1339. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. at 1334–39. 
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because as property, these animals have virtually no rights.143  
This view has kept animals in an unstable world of 
unjustified categorizations.  Continuing to allow animals to 
be exploited under inhumane conditions, solely for economic 
efficiency, perpetuates the confusion between how different 
animals are viewed and treated.144
Because human preference will always outweigh any 
animal interest, it is hard to move away from the concept of 
animals as property.
  This uncertainty is 
holding back needed advancements in animal law. 
145  The interests of animals do not have 
much weight when there is a human interest at stake, and 
animals will continue to serve human interests, as they 
always have.146  If the trend develops where animal interests 
are put before our own, those interests will be taken more 
seriously, and we will be able to more clearly see animals for 
what they are—something more than mere property.147
Courts have not been able to sufficiently articulate a 
reason why an interest in animals is different than an 
interest in anything else.
 
148  This makes it even more 
challenging for a plaintiff to explain why his or her interest 
should matter.  Thus, many laws are ineffective and do not 
serve their intended purpose.149  Not being able to effectively 
combat animal mistreatment only dampens the current 
status of animals, preventing animal rights from being taken 
seriously and advancing.150
B. The Obstacle of Standing in Enforcing Animal Protection 
Laws 
 
Because animals are not granted standing in their own 
right in any statute, they must rely on a designated entity or 
a private citizen to speak on their behalf.151
 
 143. Id. at 1339. 
  If the entity 
chooses not to enforce the statute, a prosecutor does not 
prosecute a case, or a citizen cannot show sufficient injury to 
gain standing, then the animal is left unprotected.  It would 
 144. See Kelch, supra note 29, at 531–32. 
 145. SINGER, supra note 13, at 212. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See Kelch, supra note 29, at 533. 
 148. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 567 (1992). 
 149. See Kelch, supra note 29, at 532. 
 150. See Bryant, supra note 49, at 72. 
 151. Hill, supra note 54, at 664–65. 
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seem that because an animal may not sue for itself, that it 
would be simple for a person to sue on the animal’s behalf.152  
However, this is not the case.153
Currently, mere interest in an animal is not enough to 
satisfy the standing requirement.
 
154  There must be 
something more.155
This conflict can be seen in the different opinions in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
  This is where the conflict lies—in 
deciding under what circumstances an interest in an animal 
rises to the level needed to gain standing in an animal law 
case.  This has proved to produce inconsistencies and 
confusion among the courts. 
156  While the majority opinion 
rejected the animal nexus approach, instead focusing on the 
imminence of the injury to the plaintiffs, the concurring and 
dissenting opinions struggled more with the interest in the 
animal and when it confers standing.157  The majority 
opinion, in rejecting the theory which would allow plaintiffs 
with an interest in studying or seeing endangered animals to 
gain standing, was not able to distinguish between what a 
genuine interest was and what was not.158
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion offered a response to 
assist the understanding of the interest at issue.
 
159  The 
distinction was offered that only a genuine interest should be 
sufficient.160  The majority however was unwilling to accept 
this distinction.161  The concurring opinion analyzed the 
imminence requirement to standing differently from the 
majority opinion.162  While the majority focused on the timing 
of the injury to the plaintiffs to assess imminence,163 Justice 
Stevens emphasized the timing that the actual destruction of 
the endangered animals would occur.164
 
 
 
 152. See id. at 666. 
 153. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 560, 563. 
 156. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. at 566–67. 
 159. Id. at 583–84 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. at 583. 
 161. Id. at 567 (majority opinion). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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The dissenting opinion discussed how the distance of the 
injury should not mitigate the harm done.165  Less emphasis 
was placed on the proximity of the harm in geographical 
terms.166  The dissenting opinion also did not find it necessary 
to prove specifically concrete plans in order to gain 
standing.167
The variation in these opinions highlights the confusion, 
even among the Court, in determining what circumstances 
authorize standing.  Because members of the Court cannot 
agree on what situations grant standing, it is challenging and 
complicated for a plaintiff to even attempt to understand 
when standing is warranted in an animal protection case. 
  Requiring such a description might eliminate 
standing in a variety of scenarios.  The standard may be 
perched too high, especially for a plaintiff attempting to gain 
status on behalf of an animal by showing an injury to the his 
or her interest in that animal. 
The Ringling Brother’s elephants case168
This seems to be an underexplored topic, most likely 
because of its complexity and its tendency for arbitrary line 
drawing.  It has the potential to be disputed among opposing 
parties in animal law cases, with judges unsure of where to 
settle because it is a relatively new concept for courts to 
navigate.  Striving for ease in acquiring standing—currently, 
a seemingly difficult and intricate process—is necessary to 
ensure the proper and complete enforcement of animal 
protection laws. 
 referenced above 
could illustrate a progression in allowing standing for 
plaintiffs by focusing more on the personal connection and 
attachment to the animal, and the availability and 
opportunity to see or visit them.  However, this could also 
cause even more confusion in the parameters of what 
constitutes close enough in distance and what will be 
regarded as a sufficiently close personal relationship. 
 
 165. Id. at 594 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 166. Id. at 595. 
 167. Id. at 592. 
 168. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & 
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
plaintiff had standing because of the aesthetic and emotional injury due to his 
close relationship with the animals). 
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C. Inadequate Progression of Animal Protection Under the 
Law 
Given the inadequate enforcement and difficulties 
associated with obtaining standing in animal protection 
cases, the progression of animal rights is severely hindered.169  
The historical, as well as current, notion of animals as 
property has lead to the perception that animals do not have 
many rights, that those rights are not to be taken seriously, 
and that enforcement of any of those rights carries little 
priority.170  With such little weight afforded to an animal’s 
rights, enforcement by people on the behalf of an animal 
should be more easily accessible and uniformly enforced.  
That, unfortunately, is not how these cases transpire.171
The insufficient enforcement of the laws further leads to 
the misconception that the rights of animals, if they exist, are 
unimportant.  The rights and preferences of humans will 
always surpass those of an animal.
 
172  Although there have 
been changes and some advancements in animal law, 
stronger enforcement of the laws and greater access to 
standing is necessary. 173
IV. PROPOSAL 
  Currently, the slow and shifting 
progression of protections for animals is not enough to ensure 
that the rights animals deserve will be upheld and 
adequately defended.  A new concept of animals is necessary, 
one that moves beyond mere property.  A status that more 
accurately reflects the place animals hold in our changing 
world is overdue. 
In order for animal rights to be adequately protected, 
they must fully be understood, by both the courts and the 
people.  As many different circumstances involve animals and 
their use, the law is not black and white on what rights are 
afforded and when.  Different circumstances may call for 
different protections.  Although there is a slippery slope 
argument when giving animals rights, allowing protections 
does not need to be an all or nothing scenario in every case—
 
 169. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1333–38. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. 
 172. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 212. 
 173. See Hankin, supra note 7, at 316–19. 
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some rights may be afforded to some animals in particular 
situations depending on the circumstances involved for 
certain reasons (not arbitrary and confusing line-drawing).  
Several changes in the law should occur so that this 
understanding becomes more apparent and cohesive.  
Changes in the status of animals, as well as changes 
regarding standing, will help to clarify animal rights and will 
allow people to begin to take those rights seriously, while 
providing well-deserved protection to animals. 
A. Changes in Property Status 
A movement away from the traditionally accepted view of 
animals as property is the first essential modification.174  A 
new status with legal rights above those of property would 
help to align our currently held views of animals with the 
rights animals should enjoy.175
Animals are different than property in many respects, 
and that should be reflected in the law, as it is already being 
reflected in our lives.
  If an animal’s status was 
considered something more than property, the animal would 
be given more rights and more significance would be placed 
on its interests.  This would help promote the seriousness and 
understandability of animal rights and the need for 
protections. 
176  Animals are capable of returning love 
and of forming strong bonds with humans.177  Non-animal 
property cannot do these things.  Animals also have the 
capacity to suffer, while inanimate objects do not.178  This 
capacity separates animals from other property, and calls for 
laws protecting animals from undue suffering.179
 
  A piece of 
property can be damaged or destroyed, while an animal can 
be injured or killed.  A piece of property can be replaced, 
whereas an animal is irreplaceable as each one is truly 
different.  These concepts are different and should be 
reflected in the law through a status for animals that is above 
property and affords animals more rights. 
 
 174. See Kelch, supra note 29, at 531–37. 
 175. See Hankin, supra note 7, at 316–19. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 346, 376, 379–80, 387. 
 178. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1335, 1363–66. 
 179. Id. at 1363–65. 
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Although this proposition will help bring awareness and 
seriousness to animal rights, it may be hard to implement.  
Turning away from the historically accepted principle of 
animals as property would be a confusing and difficult task.  
It would be hard to determine exactly what the status of an 
animal is and in what ways exactly it differs from mere 
property.  However, this is a necessary change for the 
progression of animal rights.  Animal rights will not be taken 
seriously or grow if animals are incorrectly labeled as 
property by the law. 
Another necessary change to help the advancement of 
animal rights is a unifying set of rules regarding animal care 
and cruelty to be used throughout all of the states.180  A 
federal law that offers standing more easily should be enacted 
to unite the conflicting state laws that tend to diminish the 
impact and importance of animal rights by being so diverse 
and inconsistent among the states.181
Because the status of property fails to accurately convey 
the value animals have or their rights that deserve to be 
recognized, more needs to be done in making people, the 
legislature, and courts aware of these rights.  This way, the 
rights will be better understood and taken more seriously, 
and therefore better applied, and the animals will be better 
protected. 
 
A step in the right direction is allowing an animal to be a 
named party in a case—as in Palila,182 discussed above, 
where a bird was a named plaintiff.183
Maybe if more people saw animals named as parties in 
lawsuits, they would not think of animals as merely property 
anymore because property cannot sue.  There is no clear 
  This gives the animal, 
and therefore its cause, greater significance.  If more animals 
were named as plaintiffs in animal protection suits, and it 
became more common to recognize animals in lawsuits, then 
animal rights would deservingly gain greater ground.  The 
prominence and recognition in the legal community would 
give animal law the push it needs to continue to progress and 
serve animals. 
 
 180. See Hankin, supra note 7, at 368–70. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
 183. See id. 
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negative implication of allowing an animal to be a named 
party in a suit.  The interests asserted could be the interest of 
the animal itself or what would be best for people’s interests 
in that animal.  Naming an animal as a party only clarifies in 
the minds of the people what interests are at stake—a 
necessary component if animal law should continue to 
progress forward. 
B. A Shift in Standing 
The issue of insufficient avenues to acquire standing for 
animals and those with interests in animals creates problems 
with the enforcement of animal protection laws, and thus 
lessens their significance in the legal world.184
Greater protection for animals is needed because they 
cannot protect themselves.  This will come from greater 
enforcement of the laws and by allowing standing in more 
circumstances.  If these cases are given a greater priority, 
animal protection will have greater significance.  More people 
will pay attention to the rights of animals and take them 
more seriously.  Increasing enforcement and awareness will 
push animal law to co-exist with other valid laws and provide 
animals with the protections they need. 
  There are 
many inconsistencies regarding standing among the courts 
that need clarification. 
People’s interests in animals must also be better 
protected.  If a person has a genuine interest in an animal, 
that interest should be protected and enforceable in the 
courts.  If a law violator can choose to break the law by 
harming an animal, a plaintiff should have the right to 
enforce the protection of that animal’s rights.  It is not logical 
to allow someone’s interest to harm the animal take 
precedence over another person’s interest to preserve the 
welfare of that same animal, which is protected by law, 
especially when that animal cannot protect its own rights.185
 
 184. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1334–35. 
  
Even interests in the protection of animals used in farming 
and experiments should be recognized.  These animals should 
not go without protection when there are people who care 
about their rights and the animals are without the ability to 
obtain any sort of significant rights in such an 
 185. See id. 
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environment.186
A re-evaluation of the distinction between animals used 
on farms or in laboratories and all other animals needs to 
occur.  It does not make sense to afford some animals 
protection and not others, based on the type of animal and 
what purpose they are intended to serve.  This furthers the 
confusion surrounding what rights animals have, which in 
turn, slows down the progression of animal rights. 
 
Finally, Congress must expressly confer standing upon 
animals under certain statutes.187  Private causes of action 
should also be given to those statutes without a citizen-suit 
provision so that an animal’s rights can be brought to court 
directly through a private citizen.188
The legislature can combat the obstacle of standing by 
allowing animals to sue in their own name on behalf of their 
violated rights.  The legislature must give a legally cognizable 
right to animals in order for them to have standing.
  This will allow for 
another avenue of enforcement, thereby ensuring more 
animals’ rights are preserved. 
189  
Although Congress generally gives standing to persons, 
nothing limits its power to give it to something else, such as 
animals.190  Congress can, and should, allow animals to 
pursue standing in cases where their rights are violated.191  
Congress already authorizes standing for minors and 
corporations, and should create a right to have standing for 
animals too, who also have protected rights.192
CONCLUSION 
  This will allow 
for animals and those that care about them to have a more 
easily accessible avenue through which to enforce the 
animals’ designated rights. 
The property status of animals severely hinders their 
rights through creating confusion, inconsistencies, inadequate 
 
 186. See id. at 1339.  The current federal and state laws are not sufficient to 
provide this protection to animals—they simply fall short of the goals that they 
were set out to accomplish.  See supra Part II. 
 187. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1336. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. at 1362. 
 190. Id. at 1360–61. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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enforcement, and obstacles in gaining standing to sue.193  
Because animals are considered property and standing in 
animal protection cases is so difficult to obtain, animal rights 
are going unenforced and animals are needlessly suffering.  
Awareness needs to be spread to and through the people, the 
legislature, and the courts in order to highlight the 
importance of and the obstacles within animal laws.194
 
  
Ultimately, designating animals as something more than 
property, and allowing animals and people with interests in 
animals greater access to standing, will advance the 
progression of animal rights so that they more accurately 
depict the significance animals hold in our current world and 
give them the protections they deserve. 
 
 193. Id. at 1334–39. 
 194. Bryant, supra note 49, at 119. 
